By Noah Fritzhand and Anna Spear

Introduction

In November, Azerbaijan hosted the 29th Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (COP29). The event’s start was marked by sharp divisions, including disputes over the agenda, temporary breakdowns in negotiations, a boycott by Papua New Guinea, and criticism of Baku’s conference leadership. Key agenda items included increasing climate finance for poor countries, advancing COP28’s pledge to transition away from fossil fuels, and building resilient food systems, all of which featured important security and geopolitical dynamics. In the end, the agreed upon finance goal fell short of what many developing countries called for, decisions on next steps toward a fossil fuel phaseout were punted to COP30, and any progress was largely overshadowed by concerns about Azerbaijan’s COP Presidency.

Climate Finance and Geopolitics

Many civil society organizations dubbed COP29 the “finance COP,” as it would decide how much developed countries would pledge to increase climate finance, called the “new collective quantified goal” (NCQG), to developing countries over the coming years. These negotiations ended with a new finance goal of at least $300 billion annually by 2025, tripling the previous goal of $100 billion annually. However, many developing nations voiced frustration and anger with this agreement, arguing it was far below the $1-1.5 trillion of estimated needs and failed to simplify the disbursement process. Their original demands set the NCQG at $1.3 trillion, a mark that the COP29 outcome now says could be met with supplementation of other cash flows. The agreement also failed to streamline the distribution process of these funds, making developing countries wary of whether they will receive enough finance. 

Geopolitical tensions over the NCQG were palpable throughout negotiations. Western countries, wary of Beijing’s geopolitical influence, joined climate-vulnerable nations in calling for China and other high-emitting developing countries to contribute to the NCQG. Ultimately, China, India, and like-minded countries succeeded in limiting the NCQG to “inviting” their voluntary contributions. (see Dr. Scott Moore’s blog post for more on these dynamics). Relations were further complicated by the outcome of the US election, taking place only a few days prior to the start of COP29. Expectations that the United States will back away from the negotiating table ahead of COP30 hindered US credibility and increased uncertainty surrounding who will fill a potential climate leadership vacuum.

Additional resources to consider:

• The Geopolitics of Climate Change: China and the United States at the UN Security Council (CCS)
• Climate Finance, Food Security, and Cracks in the Transatlantic Alliance at COP28: Recommendations for the Global Stocktake (CCS)

Peace, Conflict, and Security 

The NCQG was a largely missed opportunity to build resilience in fragile and conflict-affected settings (FCAS), supporting security and stability. Consistently, regions most vulnerable to climate change receive the least amount of climate finance. In 2022, the ten most fragile states received less than 1% of international climate finance. The money that is received primarily takes the form of loans, placing burdens on countries that are already struggling with high debt and the compounding risks of climate change and conflict. Many countries also lack awareness and preparedness in their national security sectors to adapt, mitigate, and respond to the impacts of climate change. However, efforts to earmark equitable climate finance for FCAS failed, with language weakening over the course of negotiations. In the end, the final NCQG text completely eliminated any language on conflict and fragility, making no mention or recognition of the challenges faced by FCAS in accessing climate finance.

Azerbaijan referred to the meeting as a “COP of Peace,” called for a “COP truce” between Azerbaijan and Armenia amidst ongoing conflict, and scheduled a thematic day for “Peace, Relief, and Recovery.” Building on COP28’s Declaration of Climate, Relief, Recovery, and Peace (DCRRP), the COP29 Presidency launched the Baku Call on Climate Action for Peace, Relief, and Recovery alongside the Baku Climate and Peace Action Hub. Unfortunately, the launch of these initiatives was largely undercut by concerns that Azerbaijan, a country with a history as an aggressor in the region, was using the climate talks to ‘greenwash’ and ‘peacewash’ its global image. The Center for Climate and Security joined a community of 30+ countries and civil society organizations in endorsing the Common Principles for Effective Climate Finance and Action for Relief, Recovery, and Peace in an effort to reaffirm the DCRRP and provide a practical vision forward. 

Additional resources to consider:

• World Bank and IMF Spring Meetings Side Event: Climate Finance, FCV Settings and Future-Fit Food Systems (CCS/Nexus25)
• Security and climate change implications for humanitarian, development, and peace-building programmes in Somalia (CCS)
• Event Summary: Progressing Efforts on the Declaration on Climate, Relief, Recovery, and Peace (CCS)

The Energy Transition and Strategic Competition

Last year, COP28 ended with an unprecedented pledge to “transition away” from fossil fuels. This year, many were hoping that the negotiations would yield progress on the phaseout language. Unfortunately, petrostates like Saudi Arabia continued to undermine last year’s agreement and successfully fought any inclusion of fossil fuel language in the new NCQG or official COP proceedings.

November 15th was “Energy Day” at COP29, highlighting China’s strength in the geopolitics of the clean energy transition. In particular, China announced energy production beginning at a new 1.78 terawatt state-owned offshore floating solar park, the largest and first of its kind. This initiative is no surprise as China continues to recognize the economic benefits of its investments in clean energy. In 2023, China invested a whopping $890 billion in the clean-energy sector, equaling total global fossil fuel investments in the same year. With US investment in clean energy in question, China is further solidifying its role as the global leader in clean energy investments and reaping diplomatic gains from clean-energy investments in Africa, South-East Asia, and elsewhere.

The US election also hung over conversations about energy security. Commitments from subnational actors across the United States were voiced clearly at COP29, demonstrating a drive to continue tackling climate change at the subnational level. Further, an emphasis on the advancements under the Inflation Reduction Act suggested that progress will be far from halted over the next four years for the United States.

Additional Sources to Consider:

• Workshop Readout: Clean Energy is National Security (CCS)
• The Uncomfortable Geopolitics of the Clean Energy Transition (Lawfare)

Food Security

Food security has not historically held a high seat at the table of COPs, but last year’s conference in Dubai sparked conversations on the ways food systems interact with climate and security. Accordingly, COP29 featured a dedicated UN Food Systems Coordination Hub and a thematic day on “Food, Agriculture and Water.” Heavy hitters like the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) are increasingly discussing the ways food, climate, and conflict interact. Director-general of the FAO, Qu Dongyu, highlighted this nexus. “Building and financing resilient agrifood systems in fragile and conflict-affected areas addresses climate and food crises and saves the lives and livelihoods of millions of people,” Qu said. “Yet, not enough is being invested in these win-win solutions.” 

The U.S. Center put on several events hosted by USAID, USDA, the US Department of State, and international partners, showcasing the work being done to build climate-smart agriculture and increase food security worldwide. US investments in agricultural innovation, such as the green fertilizer projects highlighted in Africa, not only serve to reduce food insecurity but also bolster US economic and diplomatic interests in the region. Several other initiatives have been announced, including the Baku Harmoniya Climate Initiative for Farmers, which is aimed at increasing awareness of climate-resilient agriculture programs.

Additional resources to consider:

• The Feeding Resilience Plan: Safeguarding US National Security at the Crossroads of Food and Climate Change (CCS)
• The Climate Change, Food Insecurity, and Conflict Nexus (Bonn Contact Group on Climate, Peace and Security)
• Promoting Peace through Climate-resilient Food Security Initiatives (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute)

Conclusion

Every year, the impact of the climate COP is widely discussed, with many lamenting about the frustratingly slow processes and marginal gains. In recent years, some have even called for overarching reform to the entire process. COP29 delegates left Baku with unresolved critical issues even as the WMO signaled we are beginning to breach the 1.5 degree threshold set out in The Paris Agreement. However, it is abundantly clear that conversations around climate change have grown increasingly intersectional. More and more conversations on the global stage are recognizing the ways in which food systems, national security, humanitarian response, geopolitics, gender, and human rights are all intertwined with the climate crisis. It is crucial that we build on this momentum and continue to collaborate in intersectional ways. The next round of NDCs in the coming months will be critical to getting back on track before COP30 in Belém.