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Resource: US Government Climate Security Analysis, Strategies, and Policies Across Republican and Democratic Administrations

By Caroline Baxter

Over the past few decades, a bipartisan acknowledgment of the climate threat has emerged within the United States, driving successive administrations to develop strategies and policies related to climate security. Since 2011, the Center for Climate and Security (CCS) has collected and saved these documents and hosted them on its website for use and reference. These have been organized into CCS’s Resource Hub. Our latest update includes US government documents from the past four years, though our comprehensive list includes resources going back to 1990. 

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Climate Security Provisions in the 2025 National Defense Authorization Act

By John Conger

One of the 118th US Congress’ last tasks was passing the FY 2025 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). The House passed the bill on December 11, and the Senate passed it on December 18. As in each of the past several versions of this bill, some provisions relevant to climate and security were included. 

The highest profile debate came over the continuing effort by Congress to block requirements and regulations proposed by the Biden Administration requiring Department of Defense (DoD) contractors to track their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (Sec. 319). In last year’s NDAA, a one-year moratorium was put in place on requiring a DoD contractor to report its emissions. This year’s measure extended that moratorium by two years (Sec. 316). More significantly, it prohibited the Department from promulgating the regulation at all. While Congress remains concerned about putting excessive administrative burdens on DoD contractors, many defense firms already track and publicly report this information. 

Earlier this year, the International Military Council on Climate and Security published Military Innovation and Climate Change, exploring whether the military could innovate its way out of its climate challenges. One of the points made by this report was that while DoD publishes information on its own emissions, it really doesn’t have an estimate for the emissions generated in its supply chain. If it could find a way to minimize the burden, it would significantly help the Department to understand its environmental impact.

In addition, the House had previously incorporated a provision blocking actions based on President President Biden’s climate-related Executive Orders. The agreement dropped this provision, deferring to the President on direction given to the Defense Department and other federal agencies through Executive Orders. President Trump will have his own, and it will be important that they continue to support the military’s ability to maintain resilience to climate impacts.

The bill does not significantly cut the Department’s climate-related investments, though most of the cuts in previous years showed up in the defense appropriations bill rather than the defense authorization. Resolution on appropriations levels will likely have to wait until the spring. It also includes three measures that address climate resilience:

  • It extended the authority for the Defense Operational Resilience International Cooperation (DORIC) pilot program through 2027 and increased its authorized funding to $15 million (Sec 1207). This program funds engagement with foreign partner militaries on climate, environmental, and operational resilience efforts to support combatant command priorities.
  • In addition, it includes $50 million to repair and restore facilities at the US Army Garrison on Kwajalein Atoll. Recall that this site had been severely damaged earlier this year by abnormally large waves. In a separate section, the agreement requires the Defense Science Board (DSB) to conduct a study on the long-term operations and availability of the facility (Sec 245). While the DSB provision does not explicitly mention climate risk, it has previously been identified as a vulnerable installation in a DoD study published in 2018, noting that sea level rise was threatening the freshwater aquifer on the island and, therefore, its ability to support habitability.
  • It expands the National Guard’s FireGuard program, which leverages military satellites to detect and monitor wildfires, allowing it to partner with other federal agencies and outside entities to improve the capability of the program.

In conclusion, this was a relatively quiet year for climate within the NDAA. Congress sent a fairly conclusive signal that it didn’t want to focus on contractor emissions and continued incremental progress on DoD’s resilience efforts. Next year’s dynamics will be different, with changes both in Congress and the Administration, and given that the past is often prologue, we recommend readers review the NDAA provisions from 2017 and 2018—the last time President Trump served with a Republican Congress. 

Given accelerating climate risks and their security consequences, we hope the incoming Administration considers the security benefits of, at the very least, maintaining and reinforcing the climate resilience provisions enacted in the NDAA over the past several years. Risks are increasing, and the military needs to be able to operate in a future shaped by climate change.

CCS Comments on the First National Nature Assessment Zero Order Draft

By Noah Fritzhand

Last month, the Center for Climate and Security (CCS) and its Ecological Security Program (ESP) had the opportunity to comment on the Zero Order Draft for the First National Nature Assessment (NNA1) prepared by the US Global Change Research Program (USGCRP), and is publishing its input here. Last year, CCS submitted public comments on the NNA1 Draft Prospectus and published a blog post about the input. As noted at the time, NNA1’s work to assess the status and trajectory of the US natural environment and the risks of its degradation marked an important step in evaluating broader ecological security issues in the US. This report will be similar in scope to National Climate Assessments published since 2000. 

CCS continues to broadly support the themes and framework of the Zero Order Draft, and looks forward to NNA1’s completion in 2026. As indicated in the comments, the USGCRP has included the majority of the recommendations CCS made on the Draft Prospectus and incorporated them into the new outline. While all twelve of the anticipated chapters of the NNA1 have implications for domestic and international security, Chapter 9: Nature and Risk, Resilience, and Security in the U.S. and Chapter 10: Nature and Climate Change in the U.S. have the most direct relation to the work of CCS and ESP.

Overall, CCS’s comments emphasize the importance of expanding the geographic focus of the NNA1 beyond domestic, publicly owned lands and including analysis on potential risks of maladaptation to human security and U.S. national security. Below are CCS’s specific comments under the aforementioned chapters.

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Event Summary: Climate Change, Security and the New ISAB Study, “New Security Challenges”

By Erin Sikorsky

Last week, The Center for Climate and Security had the honor of partnering with the US State Department’s International Security Advisory Board (ISAB) to host a conversation on the new security challenges posed by climate change, as featured in a recent report by the ISAB.

Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, opened the discussion with an explanation of the role of the ISAB and how her office is integrating non-traditional security issues into its work. ISAB Vice-Chair and report lead Sherri Goodman (and also Chair of the Board at the Council on Strategic Risks) followed, outlining the report’s key climate security findings, and fellow ISAB members shared their perspectives as well. Finally, Kate Guy of the Office of the Special Presidential Envoy for Climate Change and Swathi Veeravalli from the National Security Council provided updates on their offices’ climate security activities and how they intersect with the report recommendations.  

This report is notable not only for what it says about climate security but also for who is saying it. To have the Arms Control and International Security office at the State Department, known as the “T Bureau,” argue for greater integration of climate considerations into what has traditionally been considered a “hard security” portfolio helps shift the conversation on this critical topic.

The report includes an explicit admonition that the State Department is not yet prepared for the array of future climate security risks, stating: “While the Department of State has elevated climate change in many respects, it is not yet prepared or organized for ways in which climate disruptions are exacerbating resource scarcity, driving competition, and fundamentally reshaping 21st century diplomacy.”

Participants pose behind the conference table following the meeting.

Additionally, the report provides concrete, illustrative examples of how the strengths of the T Bureau—understanding and analyzing signaling, deterrence, and detection regarding nuclear capabilities—also matter for addressing climate security challenges. For example, the report included a Taiwan case study, noting that “The rapid onset of climate extremes introduces weather variables that add significant challenge and uncertainty to US planning for the defense of Taiwan as well as for the continuity of certain national security-critical supply chains.” It explains how extreme weather could knock out communications platforms asymmetrically, leading to potential misperceptions by the United States, mainland China, or the Taiwanese government. Separately, the report explores how tools and methodologies for understanding and monitoring nuclear proliferation could be used to monitor geoengineering interventions, particularly Solar Radiation Management (SRM) interventions.

Overall, the report makes a strong case for better integration and mainstreaming climate considerations across all areas of US national security. As participants in the roundtable discussion noted, taking such action will require cultural shifts and strong leadership within the State Department. 

The Center for Climate and Security thanks the ISAB and Ambassador Jenkins for taking the first steps toward making such changes.