By Erin Sikorsky and Noah Fritzhand

In 2023, the Center for Climate and Security (CCS) launched the Feeding Resilience project to examine the intersection of food, climate, and national security. One of the precipitating shocks informing the project was the Russian invasion of Ukraine and subsequent global food crisis that stemmed not only from the conflict but also from climate change-driven hazards and the lingering effects of the COVID-19 pandemic. Food prices reached an all-time high in the summer of 2022, and Russia wasted no time in exploiting the fragile global food system for its political ends. As we wrote in 2022, these conditions impacted countries outside Eastern Europe, including Somalia, where consecutive droughts compounded with price shocks, Ecuador and Panama, where food shortages sparked protests.

Now, with the war in Iran, we have a second tragic example of how conflict and climate shocks intersect with one another to negatively affect food security worldwide. The conflict poses risks to food security at the local, regional, and global levels – risks amplified by intensifying extreme weather and climate hazards. Further compounding the crisis is the global humanitarian support system’s current lack of preparedness, with agencies like the World Food Program woefully underfunded. This post takes each of these challenges in turn.

The Crisis: War and the Closure of the Strait of Hormuz 

Since the United States and Israel attacked Iran in late February, Tehran has effectively closed the Strait of Hormuz to shipping. Not only has this affected oil and gas exports from the Gulf, but it has also halted fertilizer exports. About one-third of the world’s synthetic fertilizer, including urea, ammonia, and sulfur, normally transits the strait. Additionally, liquified natural gas (LNG) is a key feedstock and energy source in the production of these chemicals. The disruptions to the LNG market are now compounding with the dynamics in the strait, and as a result, prices have spiked sharply, at the worst possible moment for spring planting. 

The fertilizer market shock will have a long tail as roughly 50% of the world’s agriculture relies on synthetic fertilizers. If the application window is missed, that will affect crop yields later this year, and restarting LNG production takes time. For example, Qatar’s Ras Laffan gas complex, which provides 20% of the world’s LNG, has been shut down since early March and would take weeks to get back online once the government deemed it safe to do so. 

The closure of the Strait of Hormuz also prevents food imports from reaching Gulf countries, which are highly dependent on shipments of staple foods such as rice, soybeans, corn, and vegetable oil. What little domestic agriculture these countries can produce is also at threat because of the war’s impact on water – desalination plants have been hit in Bahrain and Iran, and a large complex in Saudi Arabia came under attack as well. 

The Cascading Risks: Extreme Weather and El Niño

These acute shocks amplify existing extreme weather strains on the global food security system, and come just a few months before an expected shift to an El Niño, the phase of the El Niño-Southern Oscillation (ENSO) characterized by warmer ocean surface temperatures. Climate change hazards have become more frequent and more intense in recent years, affecting agriculture in various ways. As we wrote in our Feeding Resilience report in 2024, “climate change is projected to reduce global calorie production and push more than 500 million more people into severe food insecurity, even in a moderate emissions scenario…reduc[ing] crop yields and contribut[ing] to price spikes.”

The transition to an El Niño will likely have a negative effect on agriculture, leading to either too much or too little precipitation. These conditions increase the likelihood of multiple breadbasket failures. In 1983, the transition to an El Niño triggered the “most pronounced synchronous crop failure event in modern record” when maize harvests plummeted. Since the ENSO phases are a global phenomenon, countries cannot insulate themselves. The 2023-2024 El Niño was illustrative of this fact, as the impacts of drought on food insecurity in Latin America were compounded by India’s lower rice production rates, a staple crop in the region. 

Extreme weather events regularly damage harvests, including in many countries now exposed to fertilizer shocks. India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, three countries heavily reliant on domestic agriculture for livelihoods and food security, have battled intense droughts, floods, and extreme storms in recent years, which have damaged key crop harvests needed to feed their combined 1.89 billion population. Additionally, these countries are highly reliant on urea and LNG from the Middle East as fertilizer inputs, making them vulnerable to price shocks. Should El Niño conditions develop later this year, as scientists predict, this region could face further strain as it would coincide with monsoon season, likely reducing the precipitation needed for agriculture. These factors could compound, leading to an even more dire food security picture.

The secondary impacts of the war, fertilizer shortages, and blocked shipping routes will likely have knock-on effects for the end consumer of staple goods like bread. Indonesia, the world’s second-largest wheat importer, has also been impacted by deadly flooding recently. When these crises converge, they could provide fertile ground for famine, unrest, and strained governance structures. 

The Context: Drastic Cuts to Food Aid

As food prices are expected to spike due to the war, and climate hazards continue to impact agriculture, global food aid is at historic lows. Contributions to the World Food Program (WFP) – the UN agency tasked with providing global food assistance – were down 34.4% in 2025 compared to the previous year. Notably, the United States, Germany, and the United Kingdom, the top three contributors to WFP, cut their contributions by 53.7%, 42.5%, and 28.8%, respectively. The WFP’s already limited funds are further strained by the war, due to the heightened cost of shipping and associated insurance prices. It is clear that funding for food security is moving in the wrong direction.

While it is uncertain how long the war in Iran will last, the WFP is warning that the total number of people around the world facing acute hunger levels could reach all-time highs in 2026 if it is not de-escalated soon. Already, the WFP estimates over 300 million people worldwide are suffering from acute hunger – a threefold increase over the past five years. 

Conclusion

As countries assess the range of economic and security threats posed by the war in Iran, they must take a systemic view of the risks to food security. They must also not lose sight of existing commitments to invest in climate resilience and adaptation to strengthen food systems. These investments are now more important than ever, and countries should heed the warning we included in our Feeding Resilience Stability Multipliers report earlier this year: “If resilience investments fail to account for climate risks and food system vulnerabilities…countries risk reinforcing yesterday’s threats while remaining exposed to tomorrow’s shocks. Climate-compounded disruptions to food supply chains, agricultural production, and critical infrastructure can undermine domestic stability, complicate military operations, and exacerbate cross-border instability—precisely the challenges resilience spending is meant to address.”