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Remembering Climate Security Champion General Gordon Sullivan (Ret)
We at the Center for Climate and Security (CCS) were saddened to hear of the recent death of our Advisory Board member, General Gordon Sullivan, US Army (ret). While serving as the 32nd Chief of Staff to the US Army, General Sullivan was an early champion of integrating climate and environmental concerns into US national security. As Sherri Goodman, Board Chair of the parent organization to CCS, the Council on Strategic Risks, and longtime colleague and friend noted in her tribute, the General “personally enabled the United States Department of Defense to lead into the climate and advanced energy era.”
In his retirement, General Sullivan chaired the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) Military Advisory Board which produced the first-of-its-kind report in 2007, National Security and The Threat of Climate Change. In the report, Gen. Sullivan offered these wise words to those skeptical of including climate change in national security conversations:
“People are saying they want to be convinced, perfectly. They want to know the climate science projections with 100 percent certainty. Well, we know a great deal, and even with that, there is still uncertainty. But the trend line is very clear…We never have 100 percent certainty. We never have it. If you wait until you have 100 percent certainty, something bad is going to happen on the battlefield. That’s something we know. You have to act with incomplete information. You have to act based on the trend line.”
In subsequent testimony to the US Senate regarding climate security risks, General Sullivan made his position crystal clear:
“After listening to leaders of the scientific, business, and governmental communities both I and my colleagues came to agree that Global Climate Change is and will be a significant threat to our National Security and in a larger sense to life on earth as we know it to be.”
CCS founders Francesco Femia and Caitlin Werrell shared, “We are saddened by General Sullivan’s passing, who was such an inspiration to us and the Center. His remarks in the CNA report were foundational to how we thought about and talked about climate security from the very beginning. We would not be where we are today on this issue without General Sullivan’s groundbreaking leadership. Though it was for too short a time, we were honored to work with him. He will be missed.”
We at the Center remain inspired by the General’s leadership and will endeavor to serve his legacy in our work in the years to come.
Climate Security Provisions in the FY24 National Defense Authorization Act
By John Conger
The Fiscal Year 2024 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) was signed by U.S. President Joe Biden on December 22, 2023. The annual policy bill often has a wide range of pragmatic provisions on energy, environment and climate activities, and this year was no exception. However, some of the policies under consideration reflected more contentious debates in Congress. I previewed these in a blog earlier this year, and now there is at least some resolution on each issue, with final resolution coming when the FY 2024 appropriations bills are passed (assuming they are, in fact, passed).
Below is a recap of the three overarching topics I highlighted previously: Emissions Counting; Blocking Climate-Related Executive Orders; and Cuts to Climate Investments.
Emissions Counting: With both the House and Senate passing a version of a provision prohibiting greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions reporting requirements for certain Department of Defense (DoD) contractors, it was reasonable to assume something similar would be included in the final bill. The conference report includes a measure that:
- Prohibits DoD from requiring non-traditional contractors (defined as those that have not had a contract with DoD in the last year) to report GHG emissions; and
- Places a one-year moratorium on requiring any DoD contractor to report emissions.
Notably, this allows the Administration to proceed on finalizing and promulgating its rule that incorporates GHG counting into the Federal Acquisition Regulations more broadly across the U.S. government. It simply creates a transition period to allow contractors to prepare for new reporting requirements.
Blocking Climate-Related Executive Orders: The House version of the NDAA carried an amendment (passed on the House floor by one vote) that blocked funds for executing a series of Executive Orders that direct Federal agencies to focus on climate impacts. It was omitted from the final version of the bill.
This is not the final resolution on the issue, as similar amendments were added to multiple appropriations measures, but it provides an inkling as to how those might be resolved.
Cuts to Climate Investments: The most sweeping cuts to DoD climate investments were made by the House Appropriations Committee in its mark-up of the FY24 Defense Appropriations bill, which has yet to pass Congress. The Committee’s cuts reduced multiple accounts with a specific intention of cutting initiatives focused on climate. These include cuts to base operations to reduce resilience investments, to operational energy research accounts that will increase the efficiency of future systems, and to programs focused on the development of hybrid and electric ground systems. In contrast, the House and Senate Armed Services committees, who are responsible for the final authorization measure, neither criticized climate investments nor cut them so dramatically as the appropriators. However, the fact that they did not include such dramatic reductions at the authorized funding levels in FY24 NDAA likely doesn’t predict how the appropriations negotiations will be resolved.
In addition to staving off the worst of the provisions meant to hamper progress on climate security and resilience, the final version of the NDAA legislation addresses climate, resilience, and energy policy in many other ways. Some notable provisions include:
- Amendments to, and formal codification of, the Sentinel Landscapes program, which links DoD with the Departments of Agriculture and Interior (and other federal agencies whom in the future elect to join as full partners) in a partnership to advance conservation and resilience in the landscapes around certain military installations—advancing each of the partner agencies’ missions complementarily (Sec 311);
- A requirement to develop a charging plan at an installation before acquiring electric vehicles for use on that base (Sec 319);
- A requirement to incorporate military installation resilience into formal guidance documents within DoD, particularly those governing installation master planning (Sec 2857);
- A technical correction in the Defense Operational Resilience International Cooperation (DORIC) program that allows DoD to collaborate with partner nations that do not have standing military forces (Sec 1226); and
- Improvements to support extreme weather forecasting (Sec 1090) and the transfer of aircraft to improve wildfire suppression capacity (Sec 1810).
Finally, the FY 2024 Intelligence Authorization Act, which was enacted in conjunction with the NDAA, included a provision that moved the sunset date of the Climate Security Advisory Committee from the end of 2025 to 2024. (Sec 7319)
Looking back at consideration by the Armed Services Committees over this year, it is clear that the connection between the impacts of climate change on the military and the mission and installation protection orientation of climate resilience authorities and actions helped climate security avoid some politicization, particularly in the House. Whenever climate change is made a partisan issue, the military mission suffers for it. Fortunately, the outcome in the FY 2024 NDAA largely maintained the pragmatic approach that has characterized how Congress has addressed these issues in the NDAAs over the past several years. While some of the proposed amendments are and remain worrying, this NDAA is certainly better than it could’ve been on climate security.
New Book: ‘The Climate General’ Explores the Critical Link Between Climate Change and Global Security
Cross-posted from the Planetary Security Initiative
With the conclusion of COP28, renowned author and former Chief of Defence of the Dutch Armed Forces, General Tom Middendorp, is releasing a groundbreaking new book, The Climate General, shedding light on the profound connection between climate change and global security:
“COP28 focused more than ever on the role of fossil fuels in climate change, and we see just how complex and difficult the subject is for the international community to tackle. This is the first time in history that we need to replace one source of energy by another, instead of adding another source. It also took place against a backdrop of wars, which are extremely destructive in nature.
As a former service member I know what the price of war is. Where there is war, there is no room for climate mitigation and adaptation. This makes it imperative to work on both ends. Climate and conflicts are two sides of the same coin; we need security and stability to address climate change, while dealing with climate change can help reduce the conflict-sensitivity in fragile areas around the world.
So the pressing question, which is both simple and complex, is the following: How can the world cope with all these dangers simultaneously? How can we match the urgent with the important?”
In ‘The Climate General’, General Middendorp draws upon his extensive operational experience and deep knowledge of geopolitical dynamics to provide readers with a unique perspective on this complex issue. He demonstrates how climate-related conflicts, extremism, and migratory flows are interconnected in today’s world. Through captivating storytelling and meticulous research, he brings to light the challenges posed by climate change and presents a clear vision for a sustainable future. He advocates for a combination of mitigation and adaptation strategies, emphasizing the importance of technological advancements and collaboration in addressing climate security challenges.
“The Climate General provides invaluable insights and serves as a powerful catalyst for change,” said Audrey Carpentier, co-founder at Éditions La Butineuse. “General Middendorp not only brings attention to the urgency of the problem, but also presents practical solutions and strategies that have the potential to create a brighter future.”
“Today I lead a global network of security leaders from more than 40 countries, the IMCCS, supported by a consortium of research institutes. We all share a firm belief that climate change and security are closely related, as climate change leads to more insecurity and security is needed to address climate change. This requires us to join forces and tackle problems at the source in a more comprehensive way”, says Middendorp.
The Climate General is recommended for policymakers, academics, security specialists, and anyone concerned about the future of our global society and planet.
Ecological Sources of Coastal, National, and Global Security
By Michael R. Zarfos
Edited by Francesco Femia
Supporting nature-based coastal resilience in the geopolitical landscape
Climate change and natural hazards threaten coastal communities and the military installations and activities that rely on them. Nature-based solutions—where ecosystems and principles of ecology are harnessed by people to deliver specific ecosystem services1—can be a tool for making these communities more secure. Conservation of existing ecosystems, in particular, can help to mitigate risk in the first place. By supporting these solutions, the security community can increase the resilience of military installations, as well as the overall security of partners and allies. Such policies will increase goodwill, protect military readiness, and bolster deterrence.
Water World
There are about 2.5 billion people living within 100 kilometers (about 62 miles) of the sea, with around 300 million living within 5 meters (about 16 feet) of a rising sea level.2 Coastal populations are expanding faster than inland ones and about a third of major metropolitan areas are located on the coast. As a consequence, past projections suggest that coastal flooding will impact around 200 percent more assets and 300 percent more people by 2050 and 2070 respectively.3 This increasing exposure is due to a combination of expanding population and investment threatened by sea level rise, land subsidence (exacerbated in some locations by coastal development), and more frequent and/or more intense natural hazards such as hurricanes and typhoons.
Coastal communities are vulnerable to a wide range of climate and ecological insecurities in addition to those linked with sea level rise and storms. For example, overfishing, pollution, and species range shifts in response to warming waters all threaten fishing and tourist economies around the world, with resultant international security consequences as national fleets increasingly come into conflict as they chase fish into contested waters.4 Equatorial countries face the additional threat of extreme heat under realistic warming scenarios. Many of these countries lack financial and institutional capacity and are subject to domestic or geopolitical pressure.