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Climate Security Policy Recommendations for the New Administration
By Erin Sikorsky, Caroline Baxter, Siena Cicarelli, John Conger, and Tom Ellison
Introduction
In the past year, the United States, its allies, and partners have faced unprecedented floods, wildfires, and heatwaves that caused thousands of deaths and billions of dollars worth of destruction and required the deployment of tens of thousands of troops. These hazards affect US foreign and security policy through multiple pathways, from the direct impacts on critical infrastructure and military resilience, to the amplifying effects on state fragility and conflict risk, food and water security, and geopolitical competition. The US Congress was prescient in warning of these risks in the FY2020 National Defense Authorization Act, signed into law by President Trump during his first term, in which climate security was defined as “the effects of climate change on the following: (A) The national security of the United States, including national security infrastructure; (B) Subnational, national, and regional political stability; (C) The security of allies and partners of the United States; (D) Ongoing or potential political violence, including unrest, rioting, guerrilla warfare, insurgency, terrorism, rebellion, revolution, civil war, and interstate war.”
Climate Security Provisions in the 2025 National Defense Authorization Act
By John Conger
One of the 118th US Congress’ last tasks was passing the FY 2025 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA). The House passed the bill on December 11, and the Senate passed it on December 18. As in each of the past several versions of this bill, some provisions relevant to climate and security were included.
The highest profile debate came over the continuing effort by Congress to block requirements and regulations proposed by the Biden Administration requiring Department of Defense (DoD) contractors to track their greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (Sec. 319). In last year’s NDAA, a one-year moratorium was put in place on requiring a DoD contractor to report its emissions. This year’s measure extended that moratorium by two years (Sec. 316). More significantly, it prohibited the Department from promulgating the regulation at all. While Congress remains concerned about putting excessive administrative burdens on DoD contractors, many defense firms already track and publicly report this information.
Earlier this year, the International Military Council on Climate and Security published Military Innovation and Climate Change, exploring whether the military could innovate its way out of its climate challenges. One of the points made by this report was that while DoD publishes information on its own emissions, it really doesn’t have an estimate for the emissions generated in its supply chain. If it could find a way to minimize the burden, it would significantly help the Department to understand its environmental impact.
In addition, the House had previously incorporated a provision blocking actions based on President President Biden’s climate-related Executive Orders. The agreement dropped this provision, deferring to the President on direction given to the Defense Department and other federal agencies through Executive Orders. President Trump will have his own, and it will be important that they continue to support the military’s ability to maintain resilience to climate impacts.
The bill does not significantly cut the Department’s climate-related investments, though most of the cuts in previous years showed up in the defense appropriations bill rather than the defense authorization. Resolution on appropriations levels will likely have to wait until the spring. It also includes three measures that address climate resilience:
- It extended the authority for the Defense Operational Resilience International Cooperation (DORIC) pilot program through 2027 and increased its authorized funding to $15 million (Sec 1207). This program funds engagement with foreign partner militaries on climate, environmental, and operational resilience efforts to support combatant command priorities.
- In addition, it includes $50 million to repair and restore facilities at the US Army Garrison on Kwajalein Atoll. Recall that this site had been severely damaged earlier this year by abnormally large waves. In a separate section, the agreement requires the Defense Science Board (DSB) to conduct a study on the long-term operations and availability of the facility (Sec 245). While the DSB provision does not explicitly mention climate risk, it has previously been identified as a vulnerable installation in a DoD study published in 2018, noting that sea level rise was threatening the freshwater aquifer on the island and, therefore, its ability to support habitability.
- It expands the National Guard’s FireGuard program, which leverages military satellites to detect and monitor wildfires, allowing it to partner with other federal agencies and outside entities to improve the capability of the program.
In conclusion, this was a relatively quiet year for climate within the NDAA. Congress sent a fairly conclusive signal that it didn’t want to focus on contractor emissions and continued incremental progress on DoD’s resilience efforts. Next year’s dynamics will be different, with changes both in Congress and the Administration, and given that the past is often prologue, we recommend readers review the NDAA provisions from 2017 and 2018—the last time President Trump served with a Republican Congress.
Given accelerating climate risks and their security consequences, we hope the incoming Administration considers the security benefits of, at the very least, maintaining and reinforcing the climate resilience provisions enacted in the NDAA over the past several years. Risks are increasing, and the military needs to be able to operate in a future shaped by climate change.
The UK Can Lead Again on Climate Security
By Siena Cicarelli and Erin Sikorsky
In his first speech as Foreign Secretary on 17 September, David Lammy provided a comprehensive and compelling case for the importance of climate change as a national security issue for the United Kingdom. Not only did he identify continued fossil fuel use as an existential risk, but he also argued forcefully that investment in climate finance in the Global South is in the UK’s best interests. He said:
“Demands for action from the world’s most vulnerable and the requirements for delivering security for British citizens are fundamentally aligned. And this is because this crisis is not some discrete policy area divorced from geopolitics and insecurity. The threat may not feel as urgent as a terrorist or an imperialist autocrat. But it is more fundamental. It is systemic. It’s pervasive. And accelerating towards us at pace.”
Such a viewpoint represents a critical inflection point in the UK’s climate security trajectory—and a potential return to its early leadership on the issue. The past decade-plus of Conservative government yielded limited progress on the UK’s initially bold climate ambitions, with London’s High Court ruling in May 2024 that the government’s climate action plan was unlawful, and widespread public criticism of plans for additional oil field drilling, and delayed regulations limiting the sale of petrol and diesel cars.
Luckily, the UK’s security and defense actors have quietly established themselves as global leaders in climate security strategic assessments, including the 2021 Ministry of Defense (MoD) Climate Change and Sustainability Strategic Approach. Over the last decade, these actors have recognized that climate change is a core risk to the UK’s energy security, food security, foreign policy interests, and economic growth. Furthermore, like Secretary Lammy, they acknowledge this issue cannot be addressed in silos or solely within national borders, making investments in climate security at home and abroad more important than ever.
With the Foreign Secretary’s comments as a foundation, the new Labour government has an opportunity to elevate and reinvigorate the UK’s existing climate security approach—starting with the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) this fall. While climate security has featured in previous overarching policy documents like the Integrated Defence Review and in internal assessments, this comprehensive review marks a key opportunity to publicly redefine climate security in the United Kingdom.
Over the next few months, the SDR will take stock of the top challenges for the country, examining the overall readiness of MoD’s infrastructure and personnel. Mainstreaming climate considerations throughout this review—from assessing whether energy supply chains are future-fit to assessing gaps in military training and education—would be an essential first step in institutionalizing climate security throughout the government.
Beyond the SDR, as CCS Director Erin Sikorsky argued in testimony before the UK Parliament in May 2024, the nation must expand its current approach to build a climate-strong national security workforce. This will require both a recognition that climate change is a cross-cutting priority that affects equities outside of the Foreign, Commonwealth, and Development Office (FCDO), Home Office and MoD, as well as a willingness to invest in the skillsets needed to translate climate science and data into sound policy. This mainstreaming must also be underpinned by a cross-government architecture that is capable of bridging interagency silos and more effectively integrating the perspectives of climate scientists.
The government will undoubtedly face significant challenges in implementing its agenda at home and abroad. Beyond domestic pushback on green transition measures like wind farms and fossil fuel tariffs, Labour faces a 20+ billion pound budget deficit and an increasingly complex geopolitical environment. But this resource-constrained environment only further underscores the need for mainstreaming, silo-busting, and more effective climate finance.
Leveraging co-benefits wherever possible—such as investments in climate-smart agriculture that also build local resilience or efforts to transition away from fossil fuels that also reinvigorate struggling economies—are key. Furthermore, building climate considerations into existing FCDO and MOD programming will help maximize the government’s impact.
As Secretary Lammy said, “ultimately there will be no global stability, without climate stability.” As climate impacts accelerate, the UK government must now adjust its posture and resources accordingly.
Event Summary: Climate Change, Security and the New ISAB Study, “New Security Challenges”
Last week, The Center for Climate and Security had the honor of partnering with the US State Department’s International Security Advisory Board (ISAB) to host a conversation on the new security challenges posed by climate change, as featured in a recent report by the ISAB.
Ambassador Bonnie Jenkins, Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security, opened the discussion with an explanation of the role of the ISAB and how her office is integrating non-traditional security issues into its work. ISAB Vice-Chair and report lead Sherri Goodman (and also Chair of the Board at the Council on Strategic Risks) followed, outlining the report’s key climate security findings, and fellow ISAB members shared their perspectives as well. Finally, Kate Guy of the Office of the Special Presidential Envoy for Climate Change and Swathi Veeravalli from the National Security Council provided updates on their offices’ climate security activities and how they intersect with the report recommendations.
This report is notable not only for what it says about climate security but also for who is saying it. To have the Arms Control and International Security office at the State Department, known as the “T Bureau,” argue for greater integration of climate considerations into what has traditionally been considered a “hard security” portfolio helps shift the conversation on this critical topic.
The report includes an explicit admonition that the State Department is not yet prepared for the array of future climate security risks, stating: “While the Department of State has elevated climate change in many respects, it is not yet prepared or organized for ways in which climate disruptions are exacerbating resource scarcity, driving competition, and fundamentally reshaping 21st century diplomacy.”
Additionally, the report provides concrete, illustrative examples of how the strengths of the T Bureau—understanding and analyzing signaling, deterrence, and detection regarding nuclear capabilities—also matter for addressing climate security challenges. For example, the report included a Taiwan case study, noting that “The rapid onset of climate extremes introduces weather variables that add significant challenge and uncertainty to US planning for the defense of Taiwan as well as for the continuity of certain national security-critical supply chains.” It explains how extreme weather could knock out communications platforms asymmetrically, leading to potential misperceptions by the United States, mainland China, or the Taiwanese government. Separately, the report explores how tools and methodologies for understanding and monitoring nuclear proliferation could be used to monitor geoengineering interventions, particularly Solar Radiation Management (SRM) interventions.
Overall, the report makes a strong case for better integration and mainstreaming climate considerations across all areas of US national security. As participants in the roundtable discussion noted, taking such action will require cultural shifts and strong leadership within the State Department.
The Center for Climate and Security thanks the ISAB and Ambassador Jenkins for taking the first steps toward making such changes.