Meeting report

Security and climate change implications for humanitarian, development and peace-building programmes in Somalia

January 2024

Abstract

As part of the project ‘Catalysing cohesive action on climate and security: bridging silos for enhanced humanitarian action’ for USAID’s Bureau of Humanitarian Assistance, ODI and the Center for Climate and Security (CCS) hosted a workshop 3–4 October 2023 in Nairobi, Kenya to discuss challenges and opportunities across climate adaptation, security, development and humanitarian aid to deliver climate-resilient development. The project aims to develop policy recommendations to make humanitarian assistance more sensitive to long-term climate risk and security dynamics. A group of select and highly experienced stakeholders with interests in Somalia were brought together to explore how actors can take more coordinated, coherent approaches that meet immediate needs while also contributing to longer-term climate resilience and stability, and strengthen the use of conflict and climate risk assessment to make investments and actions more effective.

1 Workshop participants were not given a definition of ‘climate resilience’ because one of the objectives of the workshop was to understand how participants frame climate resilience and operationalise it in interventions.
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Background

As Somalia works to break cycles of crises arising from decades of conflict, political instability and underdevelopment, the government has set poverty reduction, inclusive growth and socioeconomic development at the core of its National Development Plan for 2020–2024 (NDP9). The country’s economy is at a crossroads: livelihoods are still predominantly agropastoral, but the country is rapidly urbanising. An estimated 45–60% of the population already live in towns larger than 10,000 inhabitants; those displaced by drought or conflict increasingly stay in urban areas.

The Federal Government of Somalia was constituted in 2012 and the Federal Member State (FMS) system was established in 2015. The FMS represents a power-sharing agreement between the four clan factions (and their militias) and the minority non-clan groups (the ‘0.5’ in what is called the ‘4.5 system’), with clan allegiances continuing to drive political culture. The Federal Government, with the African Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) and the U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM), has stepped-up security and peacekeeping operations against extremist groups in Somalia, yet the security risks remain high.

Against this backdrop, climate change is making Somalia hotter in all seasons, with more frequent heatwaves. Climate change will place additional stress on water supplies, agropastoral livelihoods, food security and urban areas. However, the severity and likelihood of future risks from these climate hazards depend less on climate change itself than on the trajectories adopted today and over the next decade for Somalia’s urban and rural socioeconomic livelihoods, governmental and non-governmental peace and security initiatives, and disaster risk management and climate adaptation strategies. Humanitarian, development, peace and security, and disaster and climate adaptation actors must learn adaptively within this changing landscape, and develop responsive interventions to seize opportunities to build climate resilience and avoid exacerbating vulnerability to climate shocks.

2023. Photo credit: ODI-CCS project team
Key messages emerging from the workshop

- **Parallel action on political stability and climate adaptation is crucial for long-term resilience in Somalia.** There was consensus among participants that addressing drivers of fragility (for example, political-economy, clan-based power imbalances and a weak political settlement) is a priority. Without first addressing fragility, it is not possible for any policy, plan or action to deliver the stability or peace needed to create effective and sustainable climate resilience. The main messages here are as follows:
  
  - “If a (milk-collecting) vessel is broken, there is no point in milking the camel.” This metaphor is rooted in local tradition and was used by a workshop participant to summarise the challenge of building climate resilience in Somalia. No amount of international funding is likely to be sufficient to build a climate-resilient future in a landscape characterised by flawed political settlement, strong clan and political divisions, deeply rooted sociopolitical and economic inequalities, fluid stability, elusive security and poor governance. However, climate change will continue to accelerate with or without reform, which makes parallel action on governance and adaptation crucial.
  
  - Building climate resilience necessitates that politics and people are connected. This is currently not the case in Somalia, where civil society has little voice and politics tends to be used as a means to advance individual and clan interests.
• **Humanitarian, development, peace and climate actors must align their incentives to accomplish shared goals for Somalia.** Collaboration, coordination and review of incentives across humanitarian, development, peace and climate actors are critical to deliver conflict-sensitive and climate risk-informed programming that supports pathways to a climate-resilient future in Somalia. International actors must engage local actors and each other within their programming through better partnerships as this is critical to long-term sustainability of programming and local capacity-building.

• **A coordinated approach by international donors, federal and local government, and implementing organisations would ensure better long-term outcomes for local communities in Somalia.** Without a collective understanding of ‘resilience’ among these actors, in terms of for whom, to what, and over what time frames and scales it is needed, it will be difficult to measure how interventions can contribute to a pathway that moves the country toward the vision of a climate-resilient future and, ultimately, climate-resilient development. **Achieving these outcomes would constitute radical change to the resources, incentive structures and standard operating procedures of these actors.**

### Overview of discussions

Discussions at the workshop were underpinned by two scenarios for Somalia in the 2030s: one pessimistic and one optimistic. The scenarios were grounded in trend analysis, climate change projections and prior research.

In the pessimistic scenario, a combination of socioeconomic disruption, rapid unplanned urbanisation and increasing severity and frequency of climate change-driven hazards contributed to a large loss of livelihoods and a collapsing security landscape, deepening the already dire humanitarian crisis of the 2020s and prompting renewed civil war. This scenario featured:

- **Security:** A resurgent al-Shabaab contesting pro-government forces for territorial control and capitalising on the grievances of politically marginalised tribal elements and individuals, as well as abuses and infighting among pro-government militias.
- **Rural livelihoods:** Agricultural and pastoralism livelihoods made increasingly untenable by worsening heatwaves and drought.
- **Urban livelihoods:** Acceleration of rural-to-urban migration and livelihood loss, resulting in a collapse of basic services, including access to safe drinking water and decent housing.
- **International assistance:** A drop-off in external humanitarian, development, peace-building aid and other assistance as a result of security threats, donor fatigue and competing demand for disaster relief elsewhere.
In the optimistic scenario, by the 2030s, Somalia had adopted development, humanitarian and climate change adaptation policies that better positioned the state and local communities to navigate challenges to security and human well-being, which had remained since the 2020s but were becoming more manageable. This scenario featured:

- **Security**: A largely stable security situation – aided by inclusive clan politics and professional and cohesive pro-government forces – where extremist groups pose ongoing threats but are unable to control significant territory or impede outside assistance.
- **Rural livelihoods**: Economic diversification of agropastoral livelihoods, basic service provision and social protection mechanisms that have positioned most, though not all, Somali communities to cope with all but the most severe climate hazards.
- **Urban livelihoods**: Smoother urban growth, more diverse employment opportunities and improvements in basic services.
- **International assistance**: Reduced need for emergency assistance and increased time and resources to focus on more long-term, transformational pathways towards climate resilience.

Although the workshop’s goal was not to delve into the characteristics or the actual likelihood of the scenarios, participants agreed that the pessimistic scenario was more plausible than its optimistic counterpart. Many participants also considered the pessimistic scenario more consistent with the existing trajectory, as moving away from the trajectory would require systemic policy changes that are likely to be difficult to implement by the 2030s.

**Vision of a climate-resilient future in Somalia**

Participants discussed their vision of a climate-resilient future for Somalia, and how to support the country to work towards this vision. The vision outlined included the following shared characteristics:

- Peace and stability with reliable access to food, water, energy and health care for all segments of the population.
- Better awareness of climate change impacts and a climate-smart rural economy where climate hazards do not overwhelm the coping capacity and livelihoods of communities.
- Strengthened private sector, which also plays a greater role in bridging divides across clans.
- New economic framework based in taxation, access to credit, access to advanced technology and climate-resilient infrastructure for movement of goods and people.
- More balanced power-dynamics, with empowered community members leading policy processes.
- Capable institutions, land reforms and more integrated security, development and humanitarian planning across local and international actors.
- A stable political system that works for the benefit of all.
- Regeneration of terrestrial and marine ecosystems, sustainable natural resources management and thriving cities.
- Enhanced energy access through modern renewable sources of energy and moving away from charcoal.
- Meaningful process towards locally led development and genuine partnership, collaboration and coordination.

Workshop participants noted that there is no collective understanding, even among themselves, of the meaning and purpose of ‘resilience’. Some participants noted the reluctance of donors to acknowledge this and learn from failures. There were differences in participant views around what constitutes ‘climate resilience’ and a ‘climate secure future’, with some participants using these interchangeably and others perceiving these as separate terms. Regarding urban versus rural livelihoods, for example, some argued that agropastoralist livelihoods should be made more resilient in the face of climate change, with others viewing a climate secure future as requiring diversification away from such vulnerable livelihoods. These tensions are inherent in the barriers raised by participants, as well as proposed policy options, roles for different actors and indicators for ‘drivers’ of changing the current system, as discussed below.
In this context, there was a discussion on whether Somalia needs to develop socioeconomically to become resilient to climate change or whether climate resilience could help Somalia develop. Some participants stated that only a ‘developed’ nation can become resilient to climate change, and, therefore, a climate-resilient future in Somalia must involve development.

**Barriers to climate resilience in Somalia**

There are a number of barriers towards achieving Somalia’s transition to a more resilient pathway towards climate-resilient development. The themes of more inclusive political settlement and improved security loomed large as interrelated enabling factors required for broader steps toward climate resilience.

There was much discussion on the overall political settlement and clan-based power-sharing system in the government. There was little contention among participants on the role of clan allegiances in driving political culture, institutional incentives, policy processes, resource-sharing and even humanitarian aid. It was pointed out that the clan-based power imbalances resulting from the lack of political settlement are the root cause of low levels of climate resilience in Somalia as these complicate issues of representation, marginalise and exclude the most vulnerable, and erode social cohesion; thereby undermining Somalia’s resilience to all types of crises. This exclusion has also contributed to a legitimacy gap in governance and created avenues of exploitation for domestic powerbrokers and extremist groups alike. Some participants also noted that elite rent-seeking behaviour and corruption continues to be a risk for local resilience.

Participants discussed the challenges of building climate resilience within a weak national security architecture, and highlighted the weaknesses of the peace-building architecture, characterised by a disconnect between the Federal Government and member states, clan and political rivalries, and clan militias. Discussions highlighted the risks arising from clan-based power imbalances and clan-based militias even in liberated areas. Concerns were raised about insufficient planning to prevent misgovernance and exploitation by clans and clan militias in the liberated areas in future. It was discussed that the country may not be ready to assume responsibility for its own security alongside the drawdown of international presence on the ground. Discussions emphasised the

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2 This observation is consistent with the view that concerted mitigation action, through transitions to low-carbon economies and more environmentally sound land use, is critical to reduce the frequency and severity of climate hazards under climate change. Simultaneously, there is an urgent need to minimise possible negative impacts of climate change by scaling-up disaster risk management and climate change adaptation and building of resilience across sectors; see Opitz-Stapleton, S., Gulati, M., Laville, C., Vazquez, M., and Tanner, T. (2023) ‘Building forward better: A pathway to climate-resilient development in fragile and conflict-affected situations.’ ODI Framing Note. London: ODI (https://odi.org/en/publications/building-forward-better).

3 Called the ‘4.5 system’, this power-sharing system involves a system of fixed proportional representation of Somali clans, where an equal number of places are allotted to each of the four major Somali clans and a ‘half place’ to ‘minorities’ and to women.
urgent need for a shift away from the current status quo on political settlement and governance, to a more concerted peace and reconciliation process including the disarming of clans and need for non-military solutions for extremist groups.

There was consensus among participants that conflict inhibits climate adaptation and resilience-building. Participants agreed that as much as climate finance providers need to adjust their risk tolerances and deliver climate adaptation through a more localised agenda (as opposed to the current approach of working only with and via the Federal Government), it is challenging, possibly untenable, to deliver climate adaptation measures in the absence of security. Security is critical for accessing the landscapes and populations most vulnerable to climate change. The lack of security will continue to make it difficult to de-risk projects and ensure sustainability of infrastructure or outcomes of climate adaptation measures. It was stressed that hard infrastructure investments are at risk of becoming stranded assets in a conflict setting.

Participants noted the role of finance in building a climate-resilient future. They expressed concern on the shortfall of climate adaptation finance to Somalia despite Somalia’s high vulnerability to climate change and six consecutive failed rainy seasons. In addition to the quantity of funding, some participants were concerned that donors were willing to support billions of dollars worth of humanitarian action in Somalia but lacked the risk appetite to finance climate adaptation projects to build future resilience. They also highlighted that the prevailing project-based approach being taken by different actors on building climate resilience runs the risk of doing more harm to communities.

Participants noted the need for radical change in approaches to delivering the required transformation for a climate-resilient and secure future, including a significant increase in the quantity of resources and regular, comprehensive integration of development, humanitarian and security efforts. They agreed that current approaches and strategies are both insufficient and inadequate in delivery of climate resilience, particularly as resilience is contingent on socioeconomic development and greater peace and stability. A different scale of investment is needed to deliver on the resilience vision; not the $100 million of integration aid projects but billions of dollars (potentially from international financial institutions).

**Policy options for delivering climate resilience in Somalia**

There were different perspectives on the policy options available to deliver climate resilience, with some participants calling for a radical change in the rules of engagement by international actors, moving to a more government-controlled programme of development. Some highlighted a need for reconsideration of aid policy to recognise how aid is embedded into the political

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4 The workshop did not examine whether or to what extent specific member states have delivered on climate adaptation. Given the nature of the stakeholder group invited to the workshop, participants did not have the first-hand knowledge needed to discuss this issue.
economy of the country and address the perceived ‘harm’ of international aid in reinforcing power dynamics and providing space for corruption and diversion. While some stressed the need for stronger, inclusive and equitable policies, others cautioned that climate action and building long-term climate resilience must not be paralysed by policy perfectionism. It was pointed out that policy measures would remain ineffective in the absence of political agreement, and that the status quo of political settlement and poor governance would aggravate non-transparency and lack of accountability over resource use and sharing, political grievances and insecurity. Some participants stressed that the best policies would fail in a governance landscape dominated by clan and political rivalries.

There was further divergence on policy actions to deliver a climate-resilient future, particularly regarding urban and rural livelihoods. Some participants shared the observed reluctance of the youth to base their livelihoods within the agriculture and livestock sectors, with a growing preference for urban livelihoods. They noted that youth migration to urban areas was increasing because of their aspirations to formal sector employment and urban lifestyles, thus suggesting that policy actions should focus on urban development and youth employment in urban livelihoods. It was also noted that migration to urban areas was increasing for reasons such as transition of livelihood mixes away from farming and pastoralism, increased costs of agricultural and veterinary inputs, difficulties in bringing goods to market because of poor roads, and conflict. However, it was stated that it would be difficult for Somalia to move away from agriculture and
pastoralism completely because these sectors form the backbone of the national economy; and there is a lack of alternative sectors. Instead, the importance of preventing displacement from rural to urban areas was emphasised, alongside the need for continued support for livelihoods in rural areas in parallel with planned urbanisation, building local institutions and capacities, and supporting economic opportunities in cities.

Some participants cautioned that the narrative of a climate-resilient future must consider the alternatives (or lack of) that are available to communities. Overall, participants agreed that in the absence of alternate employment opportunities, communities and individuals deriving their livelihoods from agriculture and pastoralism will continue to be vulnerable to climate change. As a result, climate change adaptation and resilience-building measures must target these sectors.

**Actor landscape**

Participants expressed their appreciation for the willingness and growing leadership of the Ministry of Environment and Climate Change as well as the Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic Development in coordinating domestic and international action to build climate resilience in Somalia. However, it was noted that there are challenges to be overcome in establishing their leadership with other ministries. It was also pointed out that climate change-related coordination mechanisms have not been adequately operationalised by the government, and that there is a lack of coordination among different ministries. To ensure a climate-resilient future, it was stressed that all ministries need to work with the Ministry of Environment and Climate Change and the Ministry of Planning, Investment and Economic Development. Participants agreed that the country needs politicians who can rise above rivalries to think about delivering a better future for the country.

Discussion focused on the role of international actors, in particular donors and international organisations, in establishing the agenda and direction of humanitarian, development, peace-building and climate interventions in Somalia. Participants noted that actors across these sectors have begun to work in more integrated ways, but still lack a cohesive vision of their role in the long-term and complex crisis facing Somalia. Participants also noted that actors in Somalia are incentivised by the objectives of the governments, organisations or donors that they represent rather than a well-aligned strategy for bottom-up and top-down action. This disconnection risks perpetuating, and even exacerbating, the existing domestic clan-based power imbalances in Somalia.

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5 It is estimated that agriculture and livestock account for approximately 75% of Somalia’s GDP and 93% of total exports. See ‘Somalia’s First Biennial Update Report’ to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change at [https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/Somalia%20First%20BUR%20report%202022.pdf](https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/Somalia%20First%20BUR%20report%202022.pdf).

6 Discussions around human mobility at the workshop highlighted both push and pull factors, with mobility being defined as both displacement and migration.
Somalia and could lead to maladaptation,\textsuperscript{7} with examples ranging from overlapping cash transfers displacing more resilient livelihoods and uncoordinated water trucking depleting aquifers. In response, participants stressed the need to revisit incentives for collaboration, shifting away from project-based approaches towards long-term programming, and conducting robust joint risk assessments encompassing the socioeconomic, environmental, peace and security sectors. It was also suggested that international actors could benefit from working directly with local actors such as local civil society and non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

In further discussing the role of international actors, participants pointed out that international funding tends to bypass government systems and is delivered via multilateral agencies or international NGOs. As a result, international actors have limited focus on the localisation agenda and empowerment of domestic systems. Some participants noted that changes in leadership and priorities of donor nations have implications for continued support to address the multiple challenges faced by Somalia. At the same time, concerns were raised about the systemic high levels of corruption, elite capture of government systems, rent-seeking behaviour of the political and clan elite, the absence of policy ownership within the government and lack of a ‘whole-of-government’ approach. Despite positive efforts in recent years, international funding is so far insufficient to tackle marginalisation and exclusion, thereby undermining the resilience\textsuperscript{8} of the most vulnerable to multiple crises. This is not without consequences for the resilience of communities as a whole, with some groups continuing to benefit over others.

Participants noted that the domestic private sector, comprising local businesses, is an influential actor and has worked effectively across levels of government, communities and even extremist groups. However, the private sector has not been involved in interventions to build climate resilience of the Somali economy and populations at large, or in supporting transformative peace-building. Some participants observed that the private sector is focused on remaining apolitical and maintaining trust across a wide range of stakeholders, and tends to avoid involvement in political and clan rivalries. Thus, the private sector presents an untapped opportunity for building a climate-resilient future in Somalia.

Participants also discussed the role of civil society, noting that Somali civil society is still relatively weak but has a growing voice and potential influence, especially in urban areas. Social media is increasingly being used to give voice to the marginalised and excluded, and to highlight grievances. It was noted that youth and women have much to gain from a climate-resilient future and should be engaged as champions of this future as their voices are currently not heard by the political class.

\textsuperscript{7} The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change defines ‘maladaptation’ as actions that may lead to increased risk of adverse climate-related outcomes, including via increased greenhouse gas emissions, increased or shifted vulnerability to climate change, more inequitable outcomes or diminished welfare, now or in the future. It notes that most often, maladaptation is an unintended consequence.

\textsuperscript{8} The lack of definition of resilience makes it difficult to pinpoint how resilience was undermined. There were also no metrics of vulnerability to identify those who are the most vulnerable.
Drivers of change: what is necessary for delivering on a climate-resilient vision

Having discussed the barriers, policy options and roles of different actors, participants discussed the drivers of change necessary to move forward to the workshop vision of a climate-resilient future. The drivers that emerged during discussions can be summed up across five categories:

- **Visionary political leadership:** The biggest driver of change foreseen by some participants was visionary political leadership that transcends groups and personal interests and can progress toward a more inclusive and durable political settlement. An established federal system of governance with ministries acting as facilitators, the development of a whole-of-government approach, and transparent and accountable governance would provide the central and indispensable foundation for building climate resilience.

- **Progress in securing peace, stability and security:** Participants observed that peace, stability and security remain critical to meet socioeconomic needs and aspirations while building climate resilience. They emphasised the need to maintain a minimum level of security in areas under government control. All actors (including clans and extremist groups) need to be brought on board to create peace and stability for the climate resilience agenda. An incentive for political settlement is that more resources would become available to the public domain and the resulting access to all regions in the country would boost internal trade. However, this requires a significant increase in trust of the Federal Government. The risk of areas liberated from al-Shabaab experiencing clan militia infighting or abuses would remain; however, participants did not foresee instability such as that seen during clan-based warfare in 1991–1992. A related issue here is citizen empowerment and a more open society. Participants saw the empowerment of citizens as an essential step towards holding leaders accountable for delivering climate-resilient development.

- **Debt relief:** Somalia has maintained strong implementation of wide-ranging reforms to help strengthen key economic and financial policy institutions. As a result, Somalia is expected to reach debt relief at the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC) Completion Point in December 2023. This will provide new opportunities for Somalia to access finance that could be invested in economic development, therefore providing the basis for rebuilding the economy. Participants stressed that economic opportunities exist despite the crises and challenges faced by Somalia. A growing domestic economy would also open avenues for domestic resource mobilisation.

- **Shift in mindset of international actors:** Participants noted the role of international actors in driving change, in particular donors and multilateral agencies. International actors could (1) play a greater role in facilitating Somalia’s access to finance at scale and speed, (2) engage the Federal Government to increase their access to all Federal Member States for developmental and climate adaptation interventions, (3) work with government to deploy resources in line with the National Development Plan, (4) shift away from a project-based to a programmatic
approach, which is, by nature, longer-term, and (5) use a combination of top-down and bottom-up approaches to build climate resilience in Somalia. The latter involves support for implementation of national strategies and empowering of government while directing climate finance to the local level, building capacity of local communities so they can hold government and leaders accountable and harnessing Indigenous knowledge to build climate resilience.

- **Coordinated, risk-informed approach of international actors:** Discussions emphasised the role of a coordinated aid architecture in driving change. Addressing structural divisions across humanitarian, development, peace-building, climate and disaster management actors would enable coordinated action for building climate resilience. If each actor were to use their unique mandate to support shared needs, this could accelerate progress on shared goals. Peace and security actors must establish the basic foundation of stability needed for investments in longer-term climate resilience. Other drivers here include lowering risk aversion, checking leakages of aid and learning from failures. One participant summarised the change as, “we have to stop muddling along on the margins and change rules of engagement. Stop being a parallel ‘NGO state’.”

**Indicators of change**

Based on discussion of the optimistic and pessimistic scenarios, participants identified collectively indicators that would be useful signposts of the direction and pace of Somalia’s progress toward or away from a climate-resilient future (Table 1). It was suggested that these indicators could be used by different groups to monitor whether Somalia was on the trajectory to a climate-resilient future or whether conditions were deteriorating.

Additionally, coordination across international aid actors to establish similar goals, requirements and monitoring and evaluation protocols would help to reverse the challenges of siloed operations and misaligned organisational incentives.
Table 1: Indicators of progress towards a climate-resilient future in Somalia

<table>
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<th>Category</th>
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| Political settlement      | - Comprehensive political settlement that is representative of all constituencies, in particular of those currently marginalised and excluded  
                          | - Finalisation of the constitution  
                          | - Established federal system of governance with fund transfer mechanisms  
                          | - Improved federal and subnational relations  
                          |                                                                                                                                   |
| Social                    | - Strengthened civil society and media that holds government accountable  
                          | - Access to new technologies  
                          | - Representation of marginalised groups, women and youth in political and policy-making processes  
                          | - Improved social cohesion  
                          | - Increased education levels coupled with improving quality of education  
                          |                                                                                                                                   |
| Financial management and economy | - Improved public financial management and accountability  
                          | - Increased avenues of domestic resource mobilisation through taxation  
                          | - Improved access to international funding  
                          | - Growth in small and medium enterprise sector  
                          | - Investments in urban planning and resilience  
                          | - Improved urban employment opportunities  
                          | - Investments in public service and delivery systems  
                          |                                                                                                                                   |
| Humanitarian needs and operations | - Improved food security  
                          | - Improved humanitarian access to previously insecure areas  
                          | - El-Niño conditions do not aggravate food insecurity to the point where humanitarian responses are overwhelmed  
                          | - Increased responsibility from government for humanitarian response rather than relying on international actors  
                          |                                                                                                                                   |
| Peace and security        | - Withdrawal of African Union security forces backstopped by strong national security capabilities  
                          | - Durable government control of areas liberated from extremist groups  
                          | - Prevention of clan militia infighting or exploitation of local populations by clan militias  
                          | - Disarming of clans  
                          | - Defeat of extremist groups  
                          | - Initiation of a reconciliation process  
                          | - Access to basic services in all parts of the country  
                          |                                                                                                                                   |
| Climate change and environment | - Reduced land degradation  
                          | - Establishment of a government-led shock-responsive social protection system to reach the most at-risk communities and marginalised people within them  
                          | - Averting famine as a result of climate shocks  
                          | - Sustainable natural resource management and water security  
                          | - El-Niño conditions do not erode coping capacity of people  
                          |                                                                                                                                   |
| International support     | - Aid operations and climate interventions designed and delivered in partnership with government institutions in line with priorities laid down in the National Development Plan  
                          | - Government involved in design and implementation of aid-funded and climate finance-supported projects and programmes  
                          | - Shift from international community-led humanitarian responses to government-led preventative measures  
                          | - Sustained support for security and humanitarian emergencies  
                          | - Coordinated, risk-informed approach from actors within the aid architecture  
                          |                                                                                                                                   |
Final reflections of participants

- Building the vision for a climate-resilient future must be a Somali-led process and involve all parts of government, the private sector, the civil society and the youth and women in particular.
- Discussions on peace and security and climate change occur at different levels and involve different actors. Unless these discussions are convened at the same level and involve a broader set of common actors, Somalia will not achieve climate resilience.
- Access to climate adaptation finance would be a game-changer in building a climate-resilient future for Somalia.
- A joint risk-informed approach is critical to avoid maladaptation and deliver conflict-sensitive development and climate interventions. Country platforms built around country-led planning frameworks could be used to bring together all stakeholders to secure greater alignment and coordination of activities of all international and national actors.
- International actors must establish a more consistent understanding of the political economy through better partnerships with local organisations rather than subcontracting of local organisations.
- Improved security and inclusive governance are critical to building a climate-resilient future.

The workshop illustrated important opportunities for donors and climate, security, humanitarian and development actors to better align their work for more positive and sustainable long-term impact. Climate and security risk assessments to avoid maladaptation and exacerbation of conflict or imbalanced power dynamics should be a prerequisite for operating in areas of protracted crisis. Additionally, coordination across donors is required to establish similar goals, requirements and monitoring and evaluation protocols through better organisational incentives. Interdisciplinary training could help to build relationships between on-the-ground actors within Somalia from the outset of their programmes and help to build greater continuity amid high staff turnover.
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